294 research outputs found

    Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond

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    We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem. We prove that the approximation ratio of random priority is Theta(n^{-1/2}) while no truthful-in-expectation mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than O(n^{-1/2}), where n is the number of agents and items. Furthermore, we prove that the approximation ratio of all ordinal (not necessarily truthful-in-expectation) mechanisms is upper bounded by O(n^{-1/2}), indicating that random priority is asymptotically the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the best ordinal mechanism for the problem.Comment: 13 page

    Profile-Based Optimal Matchings in the Student-Project Allocation Problem

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    In the Student/Project Allocation problem (spa) we seek to assign students to individual or group projects offered by lecturers. Students provide a list of projects they find acceptable in order of preference. Each student can be assigned to at most one project and there are constraints on the maximum number of students that can be assigned to each project and lecturer. We seek matchings of students to projects that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector whose rth component indicates how many students have their rth-choice project. We present an efficient algorithm for finding agreedy maximum matching in the spa context – this is a maximum matching whose profile is lexicographically maximum. We then show how to adapt this algorithm to find a generous maximum matching – this is a matching whose reverse profile is lexicographically minimum. Our algorithms involve finding optimal flows in networks. We demonstrate how this approach can allow for additional constraints, such as lecturer lower quotas, to be handled flexibly

    Social Welfare in One-sided Matching Markets without Money

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    We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms that do not involve any monetary payments. We consider two natural measures of social welfare: the ordinal welfare factor which measures the number of agents that are at least as happy as in some unknown, arbitrary benchmark allocation, and the linear welfare factor which assumes an agent's utility linearly decreases down his preference lists, and measures the total utility to that achieved by an optimal allocation. We analyze two matching mechanisms which have been extensively studied by economists. The first mechanism is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) where agents are ordered in accordance with a randomly chosen permutation, and are successively allocated their best choice among the unallocated items. The second mechanism is the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8], which computes a fractional allocation that can be expressed as a convex combination of integral allocations. The welfare factor of a mechanism is the infimum over all instances. For RSD, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is asymptotically 1/2, while the linear welfare factor lies in the interval [.526, 2/3]. For PS, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is also 1/2 while the linear welfare factor is roughly 2/3. To our knowledge, these results are the first non-trivial performance guarantees for these natural mechanisms

    Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship

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    We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is to produce such an assignment that minimizes the social cost, i.e., the total distance between the most-preferred points of the agents and their corresponding facilities in the assignment, under the constraint of truthfulness, which ensures that agents do not misreport their most-preferred points. We propose a resource augmentation framework, where a truthful mechanism is evaluated by its worst-case performance on an instance with enhanced facility capacities against the optimal mechanism on the same instance with the original capacities. We study a very well-known mechanism, Serial Dictatorship, and provide an exact analysis of its performance. Although Serial Dictatorship is a purely combinatorial mechanism, our analysis uses linear programming; a linear program expresses its greedy nature as well as the structure of the input, and finds the input instance that enforces the mechanism have its worst-case performance. Bounding the objective of the linear program using duality arguments allows us to compute tight bounds on the approximation ratio. Among other results, we prove that Serial Dictatorship has approximation ratio g/(g2)g/(g-2) when the capacities are multiplied by any integer g3g \geq 3. Our results suggest that even a limited augmentation of the resources can have wondrous effects on the performance of the mechanism and in particular, the approximation ratio goes to 1 as the augmentation factor becomes large. We complement our results with bounds on the approximation ratio of Random Serial Dictatorship, the randomized version of Serial Dictatorship, when there is no resource augmentation

    Bioavailability of heavy metals in drilling muds

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    Experimental work on uptake of metals from sediments spiked with barite, ilmenite and hematite were performed using the ragworm Nereis diversicolor and the netted dog whelk Hinia (Nassarius) reticulata as test organisms. The present report also provides a brief review of recent litterature on biological effects of metals in drill cuttings, including relevant results from the UKOOA Drill Cuttings Initiative - an international research programme completed in December 2001. The review suggest low to moderate bioaccumulation and toxicity of metals in drill cuttings to marine organisms. The experimental work was performed in a standard test set-up at Solbergstrand Marine Research Station. The test determines enrichment ratios in exposed vs control organisms. Ratios of 67 and 76 for the respective species showed significant uptake of barium from marine sediments spiked with barite. Similarly, significant uptake of titanium were observed in organisms exposed to ilmenite. All other elements (Al, Li, Fe, Zn, Hg, Cd, Pb, Cu, Cr and Ni) showed no significant uptake and ratios within the range 0,6-1,5. This result was partly explained by anomalous low concentrations of Pb in the barite test substance, partly by the presence in several test substances of major fractions of Cr, Ni, Zn and Cu insoluble in standard nitric acid digestion (NS4770). Toxic effects of metals strongly bound in particulate mineral fractions are not expected.Norbar Minerals A

    Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms

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    We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of Ω(n)\Omega(\sqrt{n}) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms

    Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties

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    We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the \emph{Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT)} that effectively handles ties via properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist

    Rank Maximal Matchings -- Structure and Algorithms

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    Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and ranks on the edges denote preferences of the agents over posts. A matching M in G is rank-maximal if it matches the maximum number of applicants to their top-rank post, subject to this, the maximum number of applicants to their second rank post and so on. In this paper, we develop a switching graph characterization of rank-maximal matchings, which is a useful tool that encodes all rank-maximal matchings in an instance. The characterization leads to simple and efficient algorithms for several interesting problems. In particular, we give an efficient algorithm to compute the set of rank-maximal pairs in an instance. We show that the problem of counting the number of rank-maximal matchings is #P-Complete and also give an FPRAS for the problem. Finally, we consider the problem of deciding whether a rank-maximal matching is popular among all the rank-maximal matchings in a given instance, and give an efficient algorithm for the problem

    Biomarkers in monitoring - a review

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    Årsliste 2006Biological effects are increasingly used to monitor impacts of contaminants in marine ecosystems. Biomarkers have been defined as ”biochemical, cellular, physiological or behavioural variations in the tissue or body fluids or at the level of whole organism that provide evidence of exposure to chemical pollutants, and may also indicate a toxic effect”. The biomarkers reviewed here were PAH bile metabolites, cytochrome P4501A, glutathione S-transferase, markers for DNA damage (adducts, alkaline unwinding, Comet assay), micronucleus formation, peroxisomal proliferation, acetyl cholinesterase inhibition, metallothionein, vitellogenin and delta-aminolevulinic acid dehydratase. Focus for the review was dose-response relationships, confounding factors, links to population effects, baseline values, assessment criteria and quality assurance for the relevant biomarker. Whereas correlative links to population-relevant effects have been found for some biomarkers, e.g. biomarkers for DNA damage, most biomarkers are generally more useful as markers for possible impacts elsewhere in ecosystems.OL

    Sink i ferskvann - kjemi, tilførsler og biologiske effekter

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    Det er laget en kunnskapsstatus for betydningen av sink i ferskvann med særlig vekt på tilførsler fra gruveavrenning. I tillegg ble det utført en undersøkelse av biologiske effekter i et vassdrag. Sveselva, med sink-belastning, men få andre metaller. Alle levende organismer har behov for sink, men det er begrensede kunnskaper om mekanismene bak giftigheten til metallet. Effekt-grenser for akvatiske organismer varier fra 10 til over 1000 µg/l. Blant de mest følsomme organismene er enkelte alger, planktoniske krepsdyr og utviklingsstadier hos fisk. I Sveselva var det tilsynelatende effekter på vegetasjon (begroing) allerede ved 20-30 µg/l, men det er usikkert om dette var det reelle belastningsnivået. Både vegetasjon og bunndyr var klart påvirket på stasjoner med konsentrasjoner i området 250-670 µg/l. Kadmium og sink akkumulerte i gjellene til utplassert dammusling på alle stasjoner nedenfor tilførslene og førte til noe forhøyede konsentrasjoner av metallotionein. Dammusling med høye metall-nivåer i gjellene filtrerte mindre alger og hadde høyere respirasjon enn dammusling med lavere metall-nivåer i gjellene. Resultatene viser at det er viktig å benytte flere mål for biologiske effekter i overvåking av effektene av metall-forurensning og å integrere kjemisk og biologisk overvåking
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